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1. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of two-sided matchings is very well studied in the game theoretical 
literature. Its generalized version, with only one kind of agents (the stable room-
mates problem) is in sorne sense not so elegant, since there are instances where no 
stable matching exists. One possibility for avoiding this difficulty is to restrict the 
set of considered preferences, as was studied by Alcalde [1]. Another approach was 
suggested by Romero-Medina [3] in the sense that not only pairs, but also groups 
of different cardinality are allowed. Since the set of agents is now partitioned into 
several disjoint subsets, we shaH also use the term stable partition instead of 'match-
ing'. 
There are several practical situations, that could be modelled as the stable par-
tition problem. Suppose e.g. that a group of graduates is contemplating to start 
!their own new firms, towns plan to join their efforts in establishing a certain kind 
of services, or, in international politics, countries are forming military coalitions, 
etc. Stable partitions are similar to coalition formation games, but compared to 
games given by their characteristic function, our approach is more suitable when it 
is difficult to evaluate the worth of a coalition. 
At the beginning, each agent has preferences over other agents. We consider 
two possibilities of extending the preferences over individuals to preferences over 
,groups of agents. In the first case, an agent decides according to the most prefered 
member of a set and to the size of the seto We show that for such preferences a 
stable partition exists for any instance of the problem, if aH the preferences are 
strict, and propose a simple mechanism for finding a stable partition. Moreover, 
this mechanism turns out to be strategy proof. In the second case, the preferences 
over sets are derived from preferences over the worst member of a seto We show 
that again, if all the preferences are strict, the problem is very similar to the stable 
roommates problem. 
2. DEFINITIONS 
N = {l, 2, ... , n} is the set of agents. The preferences of agent i over the set N 
are denoted by P(i). Notation j -<¡ k means that i prefers k over j, j "'¡ k means 
that i is indifferent between j and k and by j ={.¡ k we mean that i prefers k over 
j or is indifferent between them. The same symbols will later be used to denote 
preferences over sets. A preference profile (P(l), P(2), ...P(n)) will be denoted by 
P. We shall consider partitions ofthe set N, like M = (M1 ,M2, ... ,Mr ), where 
Mp and Mq are disjoint if p f= q and the union of MI, ... , Mr is equal to N. The 
set in this partition, containing i, will be denoted by M(i). 
In writing the preference orderings of the agents we shall understand that the 
agents that are written earlier in the list P( i) of i are prefered by i over those that 
appear later in this listo Ir the agent i is indifferent between sorne agents, they 
appear in brackets. For technical reasons, in Section 3, each preference list P( i) 
will end with agent i herself. Agents that do not appear in the preference list of i 
are for her unacceptable agents. 
There are several possible ways of extending the preferences of agents over in-
dividuals to preferences over groups. We shall consider two possibilities, for which 
we need the following notation. Let i E N, M ~ N. B¡(M) is any agent j E M, 
such that j ~¡ k for all k E M. On the other hand, W¡(M) is any agent j E M, 
~-~----_._---------:-------------,---------------------
such that j ~i k for all k E M, k 1- i. (B standing for 'best' and W for 'worst', 
respectively. ) 
Definition 1. A set S is B-prefered by i over a set T (written S >-B,i T ) if 
(1) Bi(S) >-i Bi(T) or 
(2) Bi(S) "'i Bi(T) and ISI < ITI. 
{i} is B-prefered by i over sets containing only unacceptable agents and is B-prefered 
less than sets containing at least one acceptable agent. 
Definition 2. A set S is W-prefered by i over a set T (written S >-W,i T) if 
Wi(S) >-i Wi(T). {i} is W-prefered by i over sets containing at least one unac-
ceptable agent and is W-prefered less than sets containing only acceptable agents. 
Definition 1, considered by Rornero-Medina [3], represents in sorne sense an 
'optirnistic' approach, when an agent looks only at her rnost prefered rnernber of 
a set and does not care about the rest explicitly, only through the size of the seto 
Definition 2 is on the other hand a 'pesirnistic' approach, representing agents who 
are trying to avoid people whorn they do not like. We say that a partition M is 
individually rational, if M(i) >r=i {i} for every i. 
A partition M is B-stable, if there exists no set Z of agents, such that for each 
i E Z it holds Z >r=B,i M(i) and for at least one j E Z we have Z >-B,j M(j). In 
this case we say that Z B-blocks M. Sirnilarly, W-stable partitions and W-blocking 
is defined. 
Let us recall that in the stable roornrnates problern only blocking by pairs is 
considered, narnely a pair Z = {i, j} blocks a solution (i.e. partition into pairs) if 
Z >-i M(i) and Z >-j M(j). 
-------------------¡--------------------------------------
Example 1. (This example is taken from [3].) Let n=10 and the agents have the 
following preferences: 
P(l) =10,2,3,4,7,1 
P(2) =4,3,1,8,2 
P(3) =2,1,5,9,3 
P(4) =1,9,2,6,4 
P(5) =3,6,7,5 
P(6) =4,7,5,6 
P(7) =1,5,6,7 
P(8) =2,5,6,8 
P(9) =5,6,3,10,4,9 
P(10) =7,5,9,1,10 
Let us consider the following partitions: 
Ml ={1,4},{2,3},{5,6,7},{8},{9,10} 
M2 ={1,3},{2,4},{5,6,7},{8},{9,10} 
M 3 ={l ,lO} ,{2,4} ,{5,6,7},{8},{9,3} 
M4 ={1,7,10},{2,3,4,5,9},{6},{8} 
It can be easily checked that M l, M 2 , M 3 are stable against blocking by pairs 
of agents with respect to Definition 1, i.e. there is no pair {i, j} such that j ?-¡ 
B¡(M(i)) and i ?-j Bj(M(j)). However, they are not B-stable. The first two of 
them are namely B-blocked by the set {1,7,10}, because in this set each agent 
has her most prefered choice unlike in the aboye partitions. That means, that 1 
prefers 10 to 4 and 3 she is grouped with in M l and M 2 , respeetively, 7 prefers 
1 to both 5 and 6 who are her partners in MI and M2 and 10 prefers 7 to 9. A 
similar analysis shows that M3 is bloeked by {9,4,6}. On the other hand, M4 is 
B-stable. However, if we use Definition 2, M4 is not even individually rational, 
sinee in the set {1,7,10} agent 7 has an unaeeeptable partner, namely agent 10. 
M 4 is W-bloeked by the pair {1,7}, beeause 1 is now indifferent between {1,7,10} 
and {1,7} and {l, 7} >-7 {l, 7, ID}. Ir we look at M 1,M2 ,M3, we can see that 
all ofthem are W-bloeked by {5,7}, sinee Ws({5,6,7}) = 7 ""S Ws({5,7}) and 
W7({5,6, 7}) = 6 -<7 W7({5, 7}). 
Later we shall see that there is no W-stable partition for this instanee of the 
stable partition problem. 
In Section 3 we show that there exists a B-stable partition for every instanee of 
the stable partition problem if all the preferenees are striet and propose a simple 
meehanism that finds sueh a partition. In section 4 it is shown that the W-stable 
partition problem is closely related to the stable roommates problem. 
In what follows, we shall use sorne notions and facts from graph theory. 
A digraph is a pair G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertiees and E is the set 
of ares, i.e. ordered pairs of vertiees. Ir e = (i,j) E E, we say that j is the head 
of e and i its tail; both vertiees are said to be incident to e. Cardinality of the 
set {j;(i,j) E E} is ealled the outdegree ofvertex i. A sequenee (XO,XI,""X r ) is 
,a path, if (XO,XI),(XI,X2), ",,(Xr-I'Xr ) are ares in G; a path with Xo = Xk is a 
cycle. A eycle eonsisting of the single are (i, i) is a loop. A path leading to a eycle 
e is ealled a tail of this eycle, the vertiees on the eycle e and on all its tails are said 
to be the attraetion set of C. 
-------------------,--------------------------------------
3. PROPERTIES OF B-STABLE PARTITIONS. 
Let us define the first preferences digraph (FPD for short) G(P) = (V, E) for 
the preference profile P by V =N and (i,j) E E if and only if j =B¡(N). Ir all 
the preferences are strict, then in the first preferences digraph all the vertices have 
outdegree 1. Such a digraph is then a collection of disjoint attraction sets of several 
cycles. 
Theorem 1. For every preference profile, if aH the preferences are strict, there 
exists a B-stable partition. 
Proof. We shall proceed by induction on the number of agents. The first preferences 
digraph of P contains at least one cycle e = (io, i l , ... , ir-d. Let M be any 
partition of N such that e E M and suppose that Z is a blocking set such that 
en Z i- 0. Take an arbitrary ik E Z ne. Then Z ~B,¡k e, which is only possible 
when ik+l E e (indices are understood modulo r, when necessary). This implies 
that then e ~ Z. However, when e is a proper subset of Z, then members of e 
strictly prefer e to Z, hence we obtain that en Z i- 0 implies e = Z, which is a 
contradiction. Hence the members of e E M cannot belong to any set B-blocking 
M. 
That means that now it is possible to reduce the original problem P to the 
problem pI, which is obtained when all the members of e are deleted from N as 
well as from the preference lists of the remaining agents. Since the number of agents 
,in P' is smaller than the number of agents in P, the induction hypothesis applies 
and for P' there exists a B-stable partition M'. When e is added as another set to 
M', a B-stable partition for P arises. O 
----"""-"-------------------------¡-------------
The previous assertion leads to the following algorithm. In this algorithm, each 
cycle of execution ofStep 2 to Step 4 is called a round, the variable r counts the num-
ber of rounds. The partition that is obtained is denoted by M = (MI, M 2 , ••• , M r ). 
AIgorithm BSTABLE. 
Step 1. Set r := 0, V := N. 
Step 2. If V = 0, end. Else choose an agent io randomly from V. 
Step 3. io proposes to the first agent in her preference list, i 1 . i 1 proposes to the 
first agent in her preference list, i 2 etc, until an agent in this chain proposes 
to somebody, who has already made a proposal in this round. That means, 
that among proposing agents a cycle e has emerged. 
Step 4. Set r := r + 1, Mr := e, V := V - e and from all the preference lists of 
agents in V - e omit the agents from e. Go to Step 2. 
Theorem 2. Algorithm BSTABLE generates the same B-stable partition indepen-
dently from the random choices in Step 2 for every preference profile P, if all the 
preferences are strict. 
Proof. We shall show that the partition generated by AIgorithm BSTABLE (let 
us call it the FPD-partition) has the following structure: First, it contains all the 
cycles of G(P). To see this, it is enough to realize that if e is a cycle in G(P), 
then it will not be destroyed when the members of cycles reached by a particular 
execution of AIgorithm BSTABLE before e, are deleted, since the attraction sets in 
the FPD are disjoint, when all the preferences are strict. Hence as soon as an agent 
in the attraction set of e is chosen to make the first proposal in sorne round, e will 
be reached. Moreover, e may also be reached from sorne vertex, that was in the 
attraction set of another cycle in G(P) (but not directly on the cycle itself), and is 
in the attraction set of e after sorne rounds, when further entries in the preference 
lists are used in construction of FPD. Hence, aH the agents lying on cycles in G(P) 
can be deleted, and a reduced problern P' is obtained. Again the first preferences 
digraph G(PI ) is created and the partition contains aH the cycles in it etc. 
Since the structure of the partition generated by Algorithrn BSTABLE is uniqueHy 
,deterrnined by the strueture of preferences, the result of Algorithrn BSTABLE is 
independent from the order in which the proposals are rnade. 
We still have to show that the FPD-partition is B-stable. But the generated 
partition is the one defined in the proof of Theorem 1, where it was shown it is 
eStable. O 
ExampIe 1 (continued). The first preferences digraph for this problern is: 
9 -+ 5 -+ 3 -+ 2 -+ 4 -+ 1 -+ 10 -+ 7 -+ 1 
1 1 
8 6 
Cycle (1,10,7) is deleted and the new FPD is 
1 1 
8 6 
.Now cycle (9,5,3,2,4) is deleted and only two vertices, 8 and 6 are left, each having 
a loop in the new defined FPD. In this way, M4 is obtained. 
ExampIe 2. Let us illustrate the algorithrn by one more exarnple. The preference 
profile is: 
P(I) =2,3,15,10,9,1; 
P(2) =3,1,4,11,8,5,2; 
P(3) =4,2,16,1,7,6,8,9,3; 
P(4) =1,3,9,10,5,8,4; 
P(5) =1,9,10,15,14,13,2,5; 
P(6) =3,7,1,15,4,5,11,6; 
P(7) =2,5,6,16,10,8,3,1,7; 
P(8) =7,10,11,16,15,4,3,5,8; 
P(9) =3,8,1,2,6,7,9; 
P(10) =11,1,2,3,4,5,10; 
P(l1) =12,1,3,4,2,16,11; 
P(12) =13,10,11,15,16,12; 
P(13) = 10,5,4,3, 12,11 ,13; 
P(14) =15,16,13,14; 
P(15) =13,16,2,6,9,10,15; 
P(16) =15,13,10,8,9,16. 
The FPD is in the following picture: 
10 +- 13 +- 15 +- 14 
111 
11 -+ 12 16 
1 
9 
Here are two cycles, (1,2,3,4) and (10,11,12,13). After they are deleted, we get the 
following FPD: 
7 +- 8 16 =+ 15 +- 14 
1 T 
5 -+ 9 
We get two new cycles, (7,5,9,8) and (15,16). In the end 14 is left proposing to 
herself, so the resulting partition is 
AA = {{1,2,3,4},{10,11,12,13},{7,5,9,8},{15,16},{14}}. 
¡If the preferences are not strict, however, the aboye result does no longer hold. 
at may happen that the problem has no solution, or there may be several solutions, 
as is illustrated by the following examples. 
Example3. Suppose we are given the following preference profile. 
P(l) =(2,4),1 
,1'(2) =3,2 
¡P(3) =1,2,3 
1>(4) =5,4 
:P(5) =1,4,5 
Consider two partitions, MI = {{1,2,3},{4,5}} and M 2 = {{1,4,5},{2,3}}. In 
the proof of B-stability of MI we show that there is no agent i and a set Z ~ N 
such that Z>-i M(i) and Z >rj M(j) for all the agents j E Z. 
i<'irst realize that 4 strictly prefers {4,5} to every other seto Hence for 1, who now 
cannot count with 4, the only set remains, prefered before {1,2,3}, namely {1,2}. 
However, 2 would not support 1 in her effort, since she prefers {1,2,3}. 2 would be 
happier with {2,3}, which is in turn not prefered by 3 over {1,2,3}. 3 wants to be 
with 1 alone, but 1 would not accept this. 5 prefers sets containing 1, but 1 does 
not like it. Hence MI is B-stable, because no agent can find a partner to join him 
in breaking the present partition. Similarly it can be shown that M2 is B-stable 
too. 
Example 4. Suppose we are given the following preference profile. 
lP(l) =(5,3),4,1 
P(2) =3,(1,4),2 
-----------------------------,----------
P(3) =1,5,3 
P(4) =(2,5),3,4 
P(5) =2,4,5 
For agent 3 the most prefered set is {1, 3}. For agent 1, there are two most prefered 
sets, {1,3} and {1,5}. However, {1,5} is not B-stable, because {5} blocks it. 
Hence any B-stable partition must contain the set {1,3}. Altogether there are 
three possibilities, taking into account that 5 is unacceptable for 2: 
,M¡ ={1,3},{4,5},{2} 
M2 ={1,3},{2,4},{5} 
M3 ={1,3},{2,4,5} 
However, M 3 is blocked by {2,4}, M 2 is blocked by {4,5} and M¡ is blocked by 
{2,4}. 
4. STRATEGIC ISSUES 
A partition algorithm may be considered as a function 4J assigning to each pref-
erence profile P a stable partition M. Could an agent i obtain a more prefered 
result, if she submits to the partition algorithm a preference list P I ( i) different from 
her true preference list P(i)? To be able to formulate this question more formally, 
let P' = (P(1), P(2), ... ,PI(i), ... ,P(n)) and let 4J(P) = M and 4J(PI) = M'. We 
say that a partition algorithm is manipulable by an agent i if M'(i) >-i M(i), where 
>-i is taken with respect to the true preference list P(i). A partition algorithm is 
strategy-proofis it not manipulable by any agent. 
Now we can state the following result: 
Theorem 3. Algorithm B5TABLE is strategy proof. 
Proof. Suppose that AIgorithm BSTABLE produces partition M with the set 
M(i) = {i = io, i l , ... id when submitted the preference profile P and it gave 
M' with M'(i) = {i = io,Íl,.· .,im} having as input P'. (The agents are written 
in M(i) and M'(i) in the same order in which they appear in a cycle in the corre-
.sponding first preferences digraph with respect to P and P' respectively.) Suppose 
:that M'(i) >-¡ M(i). This could have happened in two different ways. 
:a) B¡(M'(i)) >-¡ B¡(M(i)). This means however, that Íl >-¡ i l and hence when 
performing BSTABLE according to original preferences, i proposed to il before she 
'could propose to i l . Due to the way BSTABLE works, as soon as the proposals 
ran into a cycle, a new partition set is created. Hence BSTABLE could not have 
created a partition containing set M(i), a contradiction. 
b) B¡(M'(i) ""¡ B¡(M(i), but IM'(i)1 < IM(i)l. Since all the preferences are 
strict, i l = Íl and since all the agents different form i behave in the same way 
under both preference profiles, BSTABLE reached the same cycle in both cases, 
again acontradiction. D 
5. PROPERTIES OF W-STABLE PARTITIONS 
Theorem 4. Let aH the preferences of the agents over individuals be strict. Let 
M be any partition containg a set with cardinality more than 2. Then M cannot 
be a W-stable partition. 
Proo! Let M E M be such that IMI > 2. Take an arbitrary i E M. Then the pair 
{i, B¡ (M)} blocks M, since i now strictiy prefers this pair to the set she has been 
in and B¡(M) is not worse than before. D 
Theorem 5. Let a preierence profile P be given. Then aH the solutions oi the sta-
ble roommates problem with respect to P are solutions oi the W-stable partitions. 
Proof. We want to show that if M is a solution of the stable roommates problem 
with respeet to P, then M is also a W-stable partition. Suppose that M is not 
W-stable. Then there exists a W-blocking set Z. Let us consider two cases: 
a) Z = {i}. Let us denote the partner of i in the stable roommates solution as 
j. Then {i} >-W,i {i,j}, which means that j is unacceptable for i, a contradietion. 
b) IZI ~ 2. Let us take i E Z such that Z >-W,i M(i). Denote j = Bi(Z) 
and consider Z' = {i,j}. Z' is obviously also W-blocking. Let {i,k},{j,/} E M. 
Since Z' is W-blocking, Z' >-W,i {i, k} and Z' ~W,j {j,/}. Definition 2 now implies 
j>-i k and i ~j 1, which can happen in one oftwo ways. The case i "'j 1would mean 
(since the preferences are strict) i = 1, and hence Z' is one set of the partition M, 
thus it cannot be W-blocking. Ir i >-j 1, then Z' fulfills the definition of a blocking 
pair for the stable roommates problem, again we arrived at a contradietion. O 
Theorem 5 does not hold conversely, as can be seen e.g. from Example 1, which 
is insoluble as the stable roommates problem. However, if from N the agents are 
omitted, that are single in a W-stable partition, the rest form a solution to the 
stable roommates problem. 
In the search for the W-stable partitions, the first natural step will be to delete 
an agent i from PU) if j is not acceptable for i, since in this case {i, j} will never 
be a stable pairo The preference profile obtained after all possible reduetions of 
this type, is called consistent (and only such preference profiles are considered as 
inputs for the Stable roommates algorithm, SR algorithm for short, described in [2], 
Chapter 4.. Let us first look at our previous examples, now i is no longer needed 
as an entry in P(i). 
Example 3 (continued). The reduced preference profile is 
P(I) = 0; P(2) = 3; P(3) = 2; P(4) = 5; P(5) = 4. 
The resulting unique W-stable partition is M = {{4, 5}, {2, 3}, {1}}. 
Example 4 (continued). The reduced preference list is 
P(I) = 3; P(2) = 4; P(3) = 1; P(4) = (2,5); P(5) = 4. 
Hence {1, 3} must be in any W-stable partition, but for the remaining agents, {2, 4} 
blocks any partition M such that {2,4} rJ. M and {4,5} behaves similarly. 
Noe we describe the modifications of the SR algorithm, needed for solving the 
W-stable partition problem. The SR algorithm has two phases. In both of them 
successively those pairs are deleted, which can never become a stable pairo The 
first phase deletes a pair {i', j} for every i' such that j >-i i' and i is the first entry 
in j's preference listo Phase 1 ends with a preference profile such that for each 
agent i, either i's preference list is empty (which means that {i} is stable), or i is 
somebody's (whom she accepts) first choice. The first phase may lead aiready to 
some stable pairs. Ir the reduced preference list of i contains only j and conversely, 
{i, j} is stable. 
In the second phase the so caBed rotations are eliminated. After this process 
either somebody's preference list is empty (and hence the stable partition does not 
exist) or in the positive case, aB the stable roommates pairs become sets of a stable 
partition. 
The aboye observations are summarized in the foBowing theorem: 
--------------------------------------------------
'Theorem 6. If the preference list ofagent i remains empty at the end ofPhase 1 of 
the Stable roommates algorithm, then {i} is a stable seto If however, the preference 
list of some agent becomes empty at the end of Phase 2, the W-stable partition 
problem is unsolvable. 
In the end, let us work out the example from [3]. 
Example 1 (continued). The consistent preference 'subprofile' is: 
P(I) =10,2,3,4,7 
P(2) =4,3,1,8 
P(3) =2,1,5,9 
P(4) =1,9,2,6 
P(5) =3,6,7 
P(6) =4,7,5 
P(7) =1,5,6 
P(8) =2 
P(9) =3,10,4 
P(10) =9,1 
Since 2 is the first choice of 3, the pairs {1,2} and {2,8} are deleted. It is now clear 
that 8 will not take part in the continuation of the game, hence she can be omitted. 
Further reduction will be achieved e.g. by 3 =Bs(N), which causes the pair {3,9} 
to disappear. Now 9 = BlO(N) and also 10 = B9(N), which leads to {9, la} E M 
and they are also omitted from N and form the remaining preference lists. We get 
P(I) =3,4,7 
P(2) =4,3 
P(3) =2,1,5 
P(4) =1,2,6 
P(5) =3,6,7 
P(6) =4,7,5 
P(7) =1,5,6 
After some more reductions, in the end of Phase 1 the following preference profile 
will be obtained: 
P(I) =3,4 
P(2) =4,3 
P(3) =2,1 
P(4) =1,2 
P(5) =6,7 
P(6) =7,5 
P(7) =5,6 
and the second phase of the stable roommates algorithm starts. We avoid here 
explanations of how to delete rotations and use a simple argument for this exam-
pie. For agents from the set {5,6,7} only the members of this set are acceptable. 
However, since each of them is somebody's first choice, a partition containing a 
:singleton will not be stable, neither a partition containing all three of them. So we 
see that there is no W-stable partition for the example given by Romero Medina. 
5. OPEN PROBLEMS ANO OIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In spite of the positive result about the existence of a B-stable partition, the 
question of how to describe al! the B-stable partitions remains open. In fact, the 
uniqueness is not ensured even in the case of strict preferences. Consider the fol-
lowing example: Let the first choice of each agent i from the set {1, 2, ... , n} be the 
agent i + 1 and her second choice i - 1 (modulo n). Then in addition to the grand 
coalition also the partition consisting of pairs {i, i + 1} is 8-stable, if n is even. 
The search for stable partitions is complicated by the fact, that at the moment it is 
not clear how to check a given partition for stability efficiently. Since every set of 
agents can now be blocking, the brute force approach would require an exponential 
number of operations. Also the question whether a 8-stable partition in the case 
of indiferences exists, has not been answered; the authors suspects that it may be 
NP-complete. 
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